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Abstract
This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative
foundations of Walrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games
in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con-
straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub-
game Perfect Equilibria of these games implement Walrasian al-
locations as the bargaining frictions vanish. The main novelty of
the result is twofold: (1) it holds for any number of agents; (2) it
is robust to di¤erent specications of the bargaining process.
1 Introduction.
This paper contributes to the literature on non-cooperative foundations
of the Walrasian Equilibrium. This research agenda dates back at least
to the early works on market games by Shubik (1972), Shapley and Shu-
bik (1977) and Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1978). More recently, the
development of the theory of strategic bargaining, pioneered by Stahl
(1972) and Rubinstein (1982), motivated the investigation of the foun-
dations of the competitive equilibrium in the context of strategic bar-
gaining games:1 rather than assuming an abstract price mechanism or
This is my third-year paper submitted to the Univeristy of Pennsylvania with
the title "alternating auctioneers and walrasian equilibrium". I am indebted to Jan
Eeckhout and Alvaro Sandroni for their guidance. I also thank the members of the
UPenn Econ. Dept. Micro-club, the participants to the 2007 SAET conference in
Kos and to the 4th Annual CARESS-Cowles Conference. Finally, although certainly
unworthy of him, I dedicate this work to the memory of Dave "Il Capo" Cass, a
mentor and a friend, who thought me a lot more than economic theory. ...certainly
not how to sing "Sweet Jane" though...
y(email : penta@sas.upenn.edu)
1See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) for a survey of this literature.
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ctitious auctioneers that deliver the market equilibrium, this literature
explicitely models the interaction among agents as a bargaining prob-
lem, and determines the conditions under which the competitive outcome
emerges as the equilibrium of the game. The main concern so far has
been the idea that the competitive outcome should emerge in economies
with a large number of agents: most of the works in this literature ex-
plored this question in economies with an innite number of agents. The
important task of extending the argument to nite economies has proved
of di¢ cult solution: only recently, Gale and Sabourian (2005) provided
strategic bargaining foundations to the competitive hypothesis, in the
context of a single good economy.2
To the best of my knowledge, only two contributions have studied
strategic bargaining foundations for nite walrasian economies: Yildiz
(2005) and Dàvila and Eeckhout (2007) consider pure exchange economies
with two agents and an arbitrary number of goods. Analyzing di¤erent
bargaining procedures, they both provide a particularly striking result:
the equilibria of their games yield walrasian outcomes, as the two players
become innitely patient. In Yildiz (2005) it is shown that a bargaining
procedure à la Rubinstein, in which the proposer o¤ers an allocation,
yields non-walrasian outcomes. In contrast, it is proved that, under cer-
tain conditions, a bargaining procedure in which proposals consist of
price vectors implement competitive outcomes. Nonetheless, Dàvila and
Eeckhout (2007) proved Yildizs conditions to be generically violated in
the space of economies, and obtain the competitive result adopting a
di¤erent bargaining procedure, in which the two players alternatingly
announce prices and a maximum trading constraint.3 If the responder
agrees, he can demand any trade consistent with the constraints he has
agreed upon. These results point out the sensitivity of the competitive
outcome to the specication of the bargaining process: a thouroughly
neglected topic in this literature.
The next step that seems natural to undertake is to generalize the
results of Dàvila and Eeckhout to economies with an arbitrary number of
agents. This presents non trivial issues of modelling choice though. The
reason is that in the two-agents economy of Dàvila and Eeckhout, the
only possible pairwise meeting also coincides with the grand-coalition of
the economy itself. It is not clear then what the natural generalization
should be. The focus of this paper is on the properties of this particlar
bargaining protocol. For this reason trade is assumed to occur in a cen-
2See Gale (2000) for a thourough account of this literature, and a discussion of
the issues raised by the nite number of agents.
3The importance of maximum trading constraints for the case of axiomatic bar-
gaining was analyzed by Binmore (1987) rst.
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tralized market, in a one-shot exchange.4 A further question that arises
naturally is whether these results are robust to di¤erent specications of
the bargaining protocol.5
The main contribution of this paper is precisely to generalize Dàvila
and Eeckhouts results to economies with an arbitrary number of agents
and to di¤erent bargaining processes. The class of bargaining games
considered here encompasses all the bargaining procedures of alternat-
ing o¤ers in which the proposer announces prices and maximum trading
constraints, in which responses are sequential, trade occurs upon unani-
mous acceptance, and the continuation game in case of rejection does not
depend on the actions previously taken by the players.6 If an agreement
is reached, the proposer acts as the residual claimant of a centralized
market: responders simultaneously choose their demands, subject to the
maximum trading constraints and the standard budget conditions, and
the market is cleared by the proposer at the announced prices.
It is proved that, as the bargaining frictions vanish, the Station-
ary Subgame Perfect Equilibria of this class of games implement Wal-
rasian allocations in economies with an arbitrary number of agents and
commodities. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst work that
provides strategic bargaining foundations in such general environments.
Furthermore, the convergence result is robust to details of the bargaining
process such as di¤erences in playersdiscount factors and the process
according to which the proposer is selected.
A remarkable aspect of the result is that it doesnt require a large
economy, or an approximation of that such as a replica economy: the
result holds for any number of agents. The limit only concerns the
playersdiscount factors. This suggests that the details of the bargaining
process may play a crucial role in determining the competitive outcome,
independently on the number of agents in the economy, and that a careful
analysis of alternative bargaining protocols may be of great use to the
research agenda that seeks to provide strategic bargaining foundations
to the competitive hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces
the economy, and the basic notation; section 3 contains the description
of the class of bargaining games, and introduces further notation and
denitions. Section 4 contains the analysis of the game and the main
results of the paper. Section 5 discusses the related literature and some
alternative specications. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to
4This issue and possible alternative specications are discussed in section 5.
5Cf. Gale (2000) and references therein.
6In section 6 we also discuss how to extend the result to procedures in which
responses are simultanenous.
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the Appendix 1. In the Appendix 2 it is shown how the main result can
be extended to bargaining processes in which traders respond simulta-
neously, applying to an equilibrium renement reminiscent of Seltens
(1975) trembling hand equilibrium.
2 The Economy
A pure exchange economy is dened as a tuple E = 
I; r; (Xi; ei; ui)i2I:
I = f1; :::; ng is the set of agents in the economy, indexed by i 2 I;
r 2 RC++ denotes the total endowments of the C commodities in the
economy. For each agent i, Xi = RC+ is is consumption possibility set,
assumed compact. Each agent is endowed with a bundle ei 2 Xi such
that 8i, 0 << ei << r and
P
i2I ei = r.
7 Agents have utility functions
ui : RC ! R. We assume, without loss of generality, that ui (ei) = 0
for all i.8 Allocations are denoted by x = (xi)i2I 2 RnC+ , where for each
i, xi =
 
x1i ; :::; x
C
i
 2 RC+ is the consumption bundle of agent i. An
allocation (xi)i2I is feasible if
P
i2I xi = r and xi 2 Xi for each i. X
denotes the set of feasible allocations:
X =
(
x 2 RnC+ : xi 2 Xi for all i, and
X
i2I
xi = r
)
Prices are denoted by p 2 RC++. The set of Pareto E¢ cient Allocations
is denoted by XPE:
XPE :=

x 2 X : @x0 2 X such that (ui (x0i))i2I > (ui (xi))i2I
	
:
Denition 1 The set of Walrasian Allocations of an economy E is the
set of feasible allocations x for which there exists a price vector p such
that (p; x) is a Walrasian Equilibrium. This set is denoted by X. For-
mally, X is such that: X  X and 8x 2 X, 9p 2 RC++: for each
i 2 I,
xi 2 arg max
yi2Xi
ui (yi)
s.t. p (yi   ei)  0
7"<<" is strict for all components. "<" allows the equality for some component,
but not all. "" means "<" or "=".
8This normalization is done simply to conform to the bargaining game, in which
it is assumed that the payo¤ from perpetual disagreement is also zero (see below).
In other words, the disagreement outcome ise interpreted as being payo¤ equivalent
to the autarchy consumption.
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Mantained Assumptions (A):
 (A1): for each i 2 I, ui is di¤erentiably strictly increasing and
di¤erentiably strictly quasi-concave on an open set Gi  Xi such
that fxi 2 Gi : ui (xi)  ui (ei)g \ bd (Xi) = ;.
These are standard assumptions in general equilibrium theory. The
last technical assumption is used to guarantee that the set of Pareto E¢ -
cient Allocations coincides with the set of Pairwise E¢ cient allocations,
that is the set of allocations for which no pair of agents can induce a
Pareto improvement through bilateral trade. (see e.g. Gale, 2000).9
 (A2): for each i 2 I, ui is strongly concave, in the sense that
det
8<:2D2ui (x) +
"
nX
k=1
Dikjui (xi) [xk   ei;k]
#
ij
9=;
does not change sign.
Assumption (A2) guarantees that the o¤er curves have no inexion
points. This condition is satised whenever the substitution e¤ect dom-
inates the income e¤ect.
3 The Bargaining Game.
In this section the bargaining procedure in Dàvila and Eeckhout (2007,
DE hereafter) is adapted to the case of an economy with an arbitrary
number of agents, and it is generalized to a wide class of bargaining
processes.
Let  = (0; 1; :::) denote a temporally homogeneous Markov process
realizing values in a (possibly innite) compact measurable space S. Let
 be a measurable function, such that 8s 2 S,  (s) is a permutation on
I:  (s) = (1 (s) ; :::; n (s)) identies the order in which agents move in
state s. We refer to the agent 1 (s)  a (s) as the auctioneer in state
s; the other agents are the traders. The selected auctioneer a (s) 2 I
announces a price vector p, and a vector q = (qj)j 6=a(s) 2 RC(n 1), where
qj represents player js maximum excess demand (hereafter, we will re-
fer to qj as maximum trading constraints, MTC ). The remaining agents
j 2 In fa (s)g, play sequentially10, 2 (s) moving rst, and so on, until
9Under this assumption, for p 2 RC++, the household optimization problem under
the Walrasian budget constraint has a solution with no need of assuming compactness
of Xi.
10In an alternative setup, available from the author, bargaining process in which
the traders respond simultaneously is considered: the main result is obtained for an
equilibrium renement considering trembles in the tradersresponses.
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n (s): they may either accept (action "Y ") or reject (action "N"). If
everybody accepts, trade can take place in the centralized market at
the price p announced by the auctioneer, subject to the tradersMTCs
(qj)j 6=a(s): traders simultaneously choose excess demands (zj)j 6=a(t) s.t.
zj 2 Bj (p; qj), where
Bj (p; qj) :=

z 2 RC : z  qj and pz  0
	
: (1)
The aggregate excess demand
P
j 6=a(s) zj is cleared by the auctioneer,
acting as the residual claimant of the market. After trade has taken
place, agents leave the market and consume the bundle of goods they
own.
For the game to be well-dened, it must be guaranteed that the auc-
tioneer is indeed capable of clearing all the individual demands consistent
with the individual budget constraints. For this purpose, it is assumed
that 8t, Pj 6=a(s) qj  ea(s): the maximum quantities the auctioneer an-
nounces that can be traded must be cleareable by him.
If any player rejects, no trade occurs and the system moves to the
next period according to the process .
Agents discount time: for each i 2 I, let i 2 (0; 1] denote agent is
discount factor, and  = (1; :::; n) denote the prole of discount factors.
The payo¤ in case of perpetual disagreement is assumed to be zero.
If agreement occurs at period t, and agent i holds the bundle xi after
trade, he consumes it and derives a utility of ui (xi). Player is payo¤
for this outcome of the game is tiui (xi). The denition of the set of
histories and of players strategies is straightforward but notationally
cumbersome, therefore it is omitted. Strategy proles are denoted by
f = (f1; :::; fn), fi being is strategy.
Notice that the class of games considered here encompasses all the
bargaining procedures that use price-posting and maximum trading con-
straints in which trade occurs upon unanimous acceptance, responses
are sequential, and the continuation game in case of rejection does not
depend on the actions previously taken by the players. It includes, for
example, deterministic processes of alternating o¤ers, or a game in which
at every period, each player is equally likely to occupy any position in
the order of move, and so on. The important feature is that the transi-
tion probabilities only depend on the current state, not on the previous
history or on the playersactions.
The following assumptions on the bargaining process will be used for
the main result:
Mantained Assumptions (R):
 (R1): If S is nite: For each i 2 I, 9s 2 S : a (s) = i; If S
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is innite: for each i, the set A (i) = fs : a (s) = ig has positive
Lebesgue measure.
 (R2): If S is nite: From any state s 2 S, each s0 2 S is reached
in nite time with probability one: 8s 2 S, 8s0 2 S,
Pr (f9m <1 : m = s0g j0 = s) = 1:
If S is innite: from any s 2 S, any E  S with positive Lebesgue
measure is reached in nite time with probability one:
Pr (f9m <1 : m 2 Eg j0 = s) = 1:
These assumptions guarantee that, from any initial condition, each
agent is selected as the auctioneer in nite time with probability one.
4 Analysis.
Lets consider the utility possibility set of the economy, dened as
U := fv 2 Rn : 9x 2 X s.t. u (x) = vg
Each strategy prole f induces an outcome of the bargaining game,
dened by a pair
 
 f ; f

, where  f is a stopping time, denoting the time
at which agreement occurs, and f is a random variable that takes values
in U , denoting the utilities agents get from the consumption bundles they
own at that period:11 notice that because of the underlying stochastic
process ,
 
 f ; f

are in general non-degenerate random variables, even
if f is a prole of pure strategies. The dependence of the outcome on
the strategy prole will be suppressed, and the outcome simply denoted
by ( ; ), when its meaning is clear from the context.
For any pair ( ; ), and for each state s, let
E [j0 = s] = (E [i ij0 = s])i2I
denote the prole of expected utilities of the outcome ( ; ) when the
state is s.
In this section we only focus on the Stationary Subgame Perfect Equi-
libria (SSP) of the game:
Denition 2 A strategy prole f is a Stationary Subgame Perfect Equi-
librium (SSP) if it is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and if, for each
player i, the continuation of the strategy fi after any partial history of
lenght t is completely identied by the realized state t.
11Given a probability space (
;F ; P ) with ltration fFtg1t=1, a stopping time is a
random variable  that takes values t = 1; 2; ::: such that for each t <1, f = tg 2
Ft.
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In words, players can condition their strategies only on the current
state and the moves previously made in that period: they dont remem-
ber actions taken in previous periods, nor previous states. Player a (s)
always makes the same o¤er when selected as the auctioneer in state s,
and for each s, j (s)s response after a particular sequence of responses
of agents i (s), i = 2; :::; j   1 is always the same.
An outcome ( ; ) is stationary if there exists a measurable subset
S  S and a measurable function  : S ! X such that: (i) t =2 S for
all t = 0; 1; :::;    1; (ii)  2 S; (iii)  = u ( ( )). In words, a sta-
tionary outcome can be characterized by a pair (; S) such that S  S
is the set of states in which agreement occurs, and the random variable
 denotes the resulting allocation. Condition (iii) means precisely that
the consumption utilities are the utilities of the allocations determined
by  in the states in which agreement occurs. Using the latter condition,
for any strategy prole f that induces a stationary outcome, we may
dene the value function of f at state s, vf (s) = E [u ( ( )) j0 = s].
Clearly, an SSP must induce a stationary outcome. Hence, the subse-
quent analysis will focus on stationary outcomes only.
The next denition introduces SSPs with no delay:
Denition 3 An SSP with immediate acceptance (or with no delay) is
an SSP in which agreement occurs in all states. Formally: f is an SSP
with immediate acceptance if it induces a stationary outcome (; S) s.t.
S = S. (This clearly entails that  = 0: no delay.)
Notice that an SSP with immediate acceptance can be characterized
by a tuple (ps; qs)s2S, where for each s, (p
s; qs) is the o¤er made by a (s)
in state s. Traders j 6= a (s) accept and choose consumption bundles
xj (p
s; qs) such that:
xj (p
s; qs) 2 arg max
xj2Xj
uj (xj) (2)
s.t. ps [xj   ej]  0
[xj   ej]  qsj
This is obvious, from the denition of subgame perfection: once an
agreement is reached, subgame perfection requires that each responder
solves the optimization problem dened in (2). In an SSP with imme-
diate acceptance, a (s)s always o¤ers the same (ps; qs) in state s. Fur-
thermore, under the mantained assumptions (A1), xj (ps; qs) is uniquely
determined for each j and s. Hence, an SSP with immediate acceptance
can be completely characterized by a tuple (ps; qs)s2S, which in turn
determines a tuple (xs)s2S of corresponding allocations.
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Given this observation, in an SSP with immediate acceptance, at each
state s the proposer a (s) optimizes under the constraint that none of
the traders j 6= a (s) has an incentive to deviate, that is 8s 2 S:
(ps; qs)2 argmax
(p;q)
ua(s)
0@r   X
j 6=a(s)
xj (p
s; qs)
1A (3)
s.t.:

uj (xj)  jE

uj
 
x1j
 j0 = s
for xj (ps; qs) dened as in (2)

j 6=a(s)
The rst constraint in (3) is the incentive compatibility necessary
for the responders to actually accept the o¤er, rather than delaying
the agreement and moving to the next period in state 1. The second
constraint is simply the subgame perfect condition discussed above.
It is worth to point out that once an agreement is reached, players
do not face a strategic situation anymore: they are simply left with the
solution of the optimization problem in (2), and they behave as price
takers. The agents strategic behavior is conned to the responses to
the o¤ers. Once the bargaining process is over, agents do not behave
strategically.12
Since, upon agreement, the responders are free to choose any con-
sumption bundle consistent with the constraints in (2), in any SSP with
immediate acceptance (ps; qs)s2S the induced allocations (x
s)s2S must be
such that, for each state s and agent j 6= a (s),
Duj
 
xsj
 
xsj   ej
  0:
The inequality is strict if the maximum trading constraint qsj is binding
in (2). Furthermore, since the proposer at s chooses the tuple
 
qsj

j 6=a(s),
conditional on the responders accepting the o¤er, a (s) can induce any
allocation s.t. Duj
 
xsj
 
xsj   ej
  0: simply making the MTC tighter.
Hence, an SSP with immediate acceptance can be characterized by al-
location o¤ers
 
xsj

j2I

s2S
, where
 
xsj

j2I is the allocation o¤ered by
a (s) at s, such that:13
8s2S :
(xsl )l2I 2 arg max
(xl)l2I2X
ua(s)
 
xa(s)

(4)
s.t.:

uj (xj)  jE

uj
 
x1j
 j0 = s
Duj (xj) [xj   ej]  0

j 6=a(s)
12Notice though that this is not an assumption: it is an immediate consequence of
the structure of the game.
13Cf. Lemma A1 in Dàvila and Eeckhout (2007)
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The rest of the analysis proceeds as follows: rst, it is shown that
if players are impatient (i.e. i < 1 for all i 2 I), in all the SSPs of
the bargaining game, agreement occurs with no delay (this is done in
section 4.1); second, the attention is focused on the SSP with immediate
acceptance for the case of innitely patient players (i.e.  = 1), and it
is shown that these equilibria induce Walrasian allocations (section 4.2).
Finally (section 4.3), a continuity argument simply delivers the main
result, summarized here:
Theorem 1 Under the set of mantained assumptions (R) and (A), as
 ! 1, the SSP outcomes converge to Walrasian allocations.
4.1 Impatient players
In this section it is proved that in all the SSP of the game with impatient
players, agreement occurs with no delay. The argument exploits techn-
niques that are similar to those used by Merlo and Wilson (1995, MW
hereafter), but it entails few important modications. As in MW, the
analysis is conducted in the space of utilities: SSP payo¤s are character-
ized as the xed points of a self-map in a space of measurable functions,
representing the utility proles induced by proles of stationary strate-
gies. The main departure fromMW stems from the particular bargaining
procedure considered here: in this setup, since agents still have room to
choose their consumption bundles after an agreement is reached, the set
of feasible utilities is an endogenous object, and therefore the SSP payo¤s
cannot be characterized as the xed points of the same operator used in
MW. Loosely speaking, MWs operator cannot be applied here because
agents are not bargaining over nal allocations or utilities. Rather, they
bargain over a procedure: once agreement is reached, the actual alloca-
tion is chosen by the agents according to the procedure they have agreed
upon. A second, minor departure from MWs analysis is that we allow
for heterogeneous discounting, while they assume a common discount
factor.
4.1.1 Immediate agreement in SSP
Proposition 1 If  << 1, in any SSP of the game, agreement occurs
with no delay
(The proof of the proposition is left the appendix).
Sketch of Proof. As mentioned, the proof is conducted in the utility
space U , through a characterization of the SSP payo¤s as xed points
of an operator dened on a space of value functions. From the previous
analysis, we know that the consumption utilities induced by any SPE
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must be such that, for each i, Dui (xi) [xi   ei]  0: hence, any SSP
determines a stationary outcome ( ; ) such that  2 U, where:
U := fv 2 Rn : 9x 2 X s.t. u (x) = v and Du (x) [x  e]  0g
Let W be the set of measurable functions w : S ! U. For each
agent i, dene the function 'i : Rn ! R such that, for all d 2 Rn,
'i (d) :=

0 if @v 2 U : v i  d i
max fvi : v 2 U, and v i  d ig otherwise
Dene the operator E :W !W such that for w 2 W,
Ei (w) (s) =

max f'i (E [w (1) j0 = s]) ;E [iwi (1) j0 = s]g if i = a (s)
E [iwi (1) j0 = s] otherwise
The crucial step of the proof is contained in the following lemma:
Lemma 2: w is an SSP payo¤ if and only if E (w) = w.
This characterization of the SSP payo¤ implies that the SSP are
e¢ cient (constrained to U). Assumptions (A1) and (A2) imply that as
long as  << 1, any delay is ine¢ cient. Hence, the constrained e¢ ciency
entailed by lemma 2 delivers the result.
To guarantee that proposition 1 is not vacuous, it is proved next that
SSPs exist indeed. The proof exploits standard xed point arguments,
and it is left to the appendix:
Proposition 2 There exists an SSP for the game with  << 1.
4.2 Innitely Patient Players.
In this section it is proved that the SSP with immediate acceptance in
the game without discounting (i.e.  = 1) induce walrasian allocations.
With innitely patient agents, under assumptions (R1) and (R2), the
proposers problem in (4) can be rewritten as:
8s 2 S :
(xsl )l2I 2 arg max
(xl)l2I
ua(s)
 
xa(s)

(5)
s.t.:

Duij (xj) [xj   ej]  0
uj (xj)  max

uj
 
xs
0
j

: s0 2 S	

j 6=a(s)
r=
X
l2I
xl
11
The reason is that under (R1) and (R2), from any state s, any state
s0 is reached in nite time with probability one. With innitely patient
players then the incentive compatibility constraint is that above because
a player would reject as long as the utility he gets in state s is lower
than what he would obtain in any other state.
Theorem 2 Under the mantained assumptions (A1), (R1) and (R2), if
i = 1 for every i 2 I, the outcome (xl )l2I of an SSP with immediate
acceptance is a Walrasian Allocation.
The proof of the theorem is completed by the next three lemmata.
Only the main lines of the argument are discussed here. The full proof
is left to the appendix.
Lemma 2.1: Under the mantained assumptions (A1), (R1) and
(R2), if  = 1, in a SSP with immediate acceptance, (xsl )l2I = (x

l )l2I
for all s 2 S:
The argument of the proof here shows that for each s, xs is an ef-
cient allocation. Under the mantained assumptions, in an SSP with
immediate acceptance it must be the case that the second constraint in
(5) is binding, which implies that agents get the same utility in every
state. The strict concavity of preferences, then implies that also the
allocation is always the same.
Lemma 2.2: At (xl )l2I , Dui (x

i ) [x

i   ei] = 0 for each i.
In this lemma the e¢ ciency of x, is used to prove that ifDui (xi ) [x

i   ei] >
0 for some i, the allocation x does not satisfy the constraints of problem
(5) for agent i. Hence, for each player, the rst constraint in (5) is also
binding at x
Lemma 2.3: (xl )l2I is a Walrasian allocation.
From the previous lemma, it su¢ cies to set p = Du1 (x1), to have
that, 8i,
xi 2 argmax
xi
ui (xi)
pxi= pei
This concludes the proof of theorem 2.
It is proved next that, if agents are innitely patient, every Walrasian
allocation can be sustained as an outcome of an SSP with immediate
acceptance: the proof is constructive, and it is left in the main body of
the text.
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Theorem 3 Let
 
p; (xl )l2I

be a WE of the economy E. Then, if i = 1
for all i 2 I, there is an SSP with immediate acceptance of the game   (E)
with outcome (xl )l2I .
Proof. Given the WE
 
p; (xl )l2I

, consider the following strategy pro-
le: (p; q) such that 8i 2 I,
 whenever i makes a proposal (i.e. for all s 2 a 1 (i)) he o¤ers
(pi; qi) such that:
pi = p;
 
qij

j 6=i are slack, i.e. q
i
j  zj (p), where
zj (p
)= arg max
zj2RC
uj (ej + zj)
s.t: pzj  0
 whenever i is responding, he accepts any o¤er (p0; q0) such that
ui (xi (p
0; q0))  ui (xi ).
The outcome of this strategy prole, starting from any subgame in
which some j 2 I has to make an o¤er, is clearly (xl )l2I . Now we check
that it is an SSP indeed.
If i deviates, he may induce one of the following types of outcomes.14
(1) Agreement is never reached: this outcome is clearly not preferred
to (xl )l2I by i.
(2) At a later stage in the game, i o¤ers (p0; q0) such that 8j 6= i,
uj (xj (p
0; q0))  uj
 
xj

and its accepted: Since (xl )l2I is e¢ cient, and
uj (xj (p
0; q0))  uj
 
xj

for all j 6= i, it cannot be that ui

R Pj 6=i xj (p0; q0) >
ui (x

i ). So that this outcome cannot be preferred to (x

l )l2I by i.
(3) At a later stage in the game, i accepts the o¤er (p; qj) made by
j 6= i, which yields the same outcome (xl )l2I : therefore, deviations to
this outcomes are not protable either.
Clearly, Theorem 3 also proves the existence of SSPs with immediate
acceptance when there is no discounting.
4.3 The Convergence result
From proposition 1, if players discount, in any SSP an agreement is
reached with no delay. Therefore, the SSP outcomes can be represented
by measurable functions y : S ! X, assigning a feasible allocation to
each state. Let Y be the set of such measurable functions. For any
initial state s, y (s) is the allocation induced by the acceptance of a (s)s
14Notice that with no discounting the one-shot deviation principle doesnt apply.
Hence we consider all the possible deviations.
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o¤er. Similarly to the above, the SSP allocations are xed points of the
operator  : Y ! Y , dened as:
 (y; ) (s)= argmax
x2X
ua(s)
 
xa(s)

s.t. for all j 6= a (s) , uj (xj)  E [juj (yj (1)) j0 = s]
Duj (xj) [xj   ej]  0
With a slight abuse of notation, lets consider the operator  as a
function of  and dene the correspondance  : [0; 1]n  Y such that
 () = fy 2 Y : y 2  (y; )g
 () is the set of xed points of , as a function of :
Proposition 3  () is an u.h.c. correspondance
(The proof is in the appendix)
Hence, as  ! 1, the outcomes of the the SSPs converge to SSPs
with immediate acceptance with innitely patient players, that we have
proved (Theorem 2) to be Walrasian allocations. Hence, theorem 2 and
propositions 1 and 3 together prove theorem 1.
5 On the related literature and some possible de-
velopments.
In perspective. Negishi (1989) distinguishes two major schools in the
analysis of markets. On one hand, the french school, represented by the
works of Cournot (1838) and Walras (1874), abstracts from the analysis
of trading mechanisms, and models the behavior of the agents as deter-
mined by prices, both in and out of the equilibrium. A second school,
associated with Jevons (1879) and Edgeworth (1881) instead studies the
exchange activity focusing more explicitely on the bargaining process the
economic agents are involved in. The di¤erence between the Jevonsian
and the Edgeworthian approaches is that in the former the trading mech-
anism is conceived as being based on pairwise interactions among agents,
who exploit the gains from bilateral trades occurring in a fully decentral-
ized market. In contrast, in the Edgeworthian view, groups of agents are
allowed to interact in larger groups. Thus, although di¤ering from the
Walrasian tradition in the conceptualization of the trading mechanism,
it shares with it somewhat of an idea of centralized exchange, rather in
contrast to the Jevonsian view.
Negishi (1989) sees the core equivalence theorem by Debreu and Scarf
(1961) as an important contribution to a research agenda that attempts
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to explore the connections between the Edgeworthian and Walrasian
views. Other cooperative foundations of Walrasian Equilibrium have
been studied in the literature: following Negishi, they can all be cast
whitin the Edgeworthian tradition.
With a little delay respect to the cooperative foundations of the con-
cept of Walrasian Equilibrium, also non-cooperative foundations have
been studied: the rst wave has been the literature on market games
(see for instance Shubik (1972), Shapley and Shubik (1977) and Postle-
waite and Schmeidler 1978). More recently, following the development of
the theory of non-cooperative bargaining, models of economies with ex-
plicit strategic bargaining have studied the non-cooperative foundations
of the competitive equilibrium. The classic works forWalrasian Markets
(i.e. General Equilibrium economies) are by Gale (1986a,b), who studies
the strategic foundations in an economy with decentralized trade and an
innite number of agents.15 The case of nite number of agents instead
has been studied by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990), Sabourian (2004)
and Gale and Sabourian (2005), but only for the case of Marshallian
markets.16
All these contibutions that apply to an explicit model of strategic bar-
gaining assume that trade occurs in pairwise meetings: again, following
Negishi, we can cast these works whithin the Jevonsian tradition.17
As discussed in the introduction, this paper contributes to the liter-
ature on (strategic) bargaining foundations for the competitive equilib-
rium, providing a generalization to Dàvila and Eeckhouts (2007) bar-
gaining procedure to economies with an arbitrary (nite) number of
agents. It is not completely obvious though what the natural general-
ization should be: in the two-agents economy of Dàvila and Eekchout,
the only possible pairwise meeting also coincides with the grand-coalition
of the economy itself. The generalization of their work can be done in
at least two di¤erent ways, reconductible to the Edgeworthian and the
Jevonsian tradition, respectively.
An Edgeworthian Model. The present paper constitutes an Edge-
worthian generalization of Dàvila and Eeckhouts (2007) model: agents
strategically bargain over prices and maximum trading constraints, and
if an agreement is reached, trade occurs in a centralized way: the non-
cooperative foundation here concerns the terms at which trade occurs,
15McLennan and Sonnenschein (1991) and more recently Dagan, Serrano and Volij
(2000) and Kunimoto and Serrano (2004) also studied walrasian economies with a
non-atomic continuum of agents.
16That is economies with a single indivisible good, exchanged against a single
divisible good (interpreted as non-at money).
17See also Kunimoto and Serrano (2001).
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not how these are a¤ected by the possibility of trade occurring in a fully
decentralized market (i.e. in a sequence of meetings). In this sense,
it is quite in the spirit of Debreu and Scarfs equivalence theorem, just
considering a model of strategic bargaining rather than applying to co-
operative game theory: the focus is not on how trade occurs, but rather
on what trade can occur, as the result of bargaining between strategic
rational agents.
A Jevonsian Model. An alternative generalization of Dàvila and
Eeckhout (2007), following the Jevonsian tradition, would be one in
which agents are sequentially matched in pairs, and the exchange process
consists of a sequence of bilateral trades. Such a setup is considered in
a companion paper (Penta, 2007): in that model, agents are exoge-
nously matched in pairs, whithin which a bargaining procedure similar
to that analyzed here is used. At the moment, it has been proved that
in large enough economies, if the initial allocation is close enough to the
set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations, then the walrasian equilibrium can be
reached in a decentralized way, through a sequence of bilateral matchings
in which agents bargain and trade. How close the endowments need to
be to the Pareto set depends on the degree of substitutability of goods:
more substitutability allows to obtain the competitive outcome in a de-
centralized way for a larger set of initial conditions. The trade-o¤ is
clearly related to the possibility of strategically manipulate the terms of
trade when either big trades are involved, or the marginal rates of sub-
stitution change a lot. Making trades smaller, or reducing the e¤ect of
trades on the marginal rates of substitution, reduces the extent to which
the terms of trade can be manipulated. The solution of the problem for
arbitrary initial endowment is a subject for future reearch.
In general, the jevonsian approach raises harder challenges: in the
papers that focus on marshallian markets we have mentioned above,18
agentsgains from trade can be exhausted in a single pairwise exchange.
Hence, although decentralized, from the point of view of each agent there
is only one relevant exchange: the real focus of the analysis is on prices.
On the contrary, considering walrasian economies, the gains from trade
cannot in general be exhausted in any given pairwise meeting: each agent
in a decentralized economy has to go through a sequence of bilateral
trades before the gains from trade are exhausted. For this reason, the
environment in Jevonsian models of general equilibrium is signicantly
more complex than in Jevonsian models of partial equilibrium (i.e. in
marshallian markets), and than in Edgeworthian models of general equi-
18Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985, 1990), Gale (1987), Sabourian (2001), Gale and
Sabourian (2005).
16
librium (as in this paper): in the latter two, each agents trade occurs
in a one-shot exchange. The high non-stationarity of the environment
in Jevonsian models of general equilibrium is the main di¢ culty one has
to deal with in models with a nite number of agents.
Directed Search: an argument in favor of a centralized model
of exchange. As mentioned above, one possible source of dissatisfac-
tion with the model of this paper is that trade is centralized: most of
the literature on the strategic bargaining foundations of general equilib-
rium instead has considered jevonsian models, assuming an exogenous
matching function that matches agents in pairs (see Gale, 2000). As
mentioned, Penta (2007) is an attempt to analyze this kind of setup.
One might instead give up an exogenous matching process altogether,
and assume that agents may direct their search, and choose whom (or
which group) to be matched with. For instance, consider a model in
which agents sequentially choose a location: if nobody is there, they are
the proposers in the local market formed by all the agents who choose
to go to that same location, and a variant of the game above is played:
if everybody agrees, trade occurs; in case of a rejection, the economy
moves to the next period and a random process selects the order of
moves (hence the opportunities of choosing to be a proposer in a given
location). Of course, if an agent is alone at a given location, he doesnt
trade. It seems quite clear that in such a setup agents have an interest in
coordinating on a given position:19 the larger the market, the larger the
gains from trade. Hence, for negligible transportation costs, a directed-
search model would endogenously induce a centralized market-place, and
together with a bargaining procedure such as the one analyzed in this
paper, implement a Walrasian outcome.
6 Concluding Remarks
6.1 On the Competitive Result:
In this model agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con-
straints. If an agreement is reached, trade occurs in a centralized way.
The results of Dàvila and Eeckhout for two-agents economies are gener-
alized to economies with an arbitrary (nite) number of agents, and to
di¤erent bargaining procedures.
It is proved that, as the bargaining frictions vanish, the Stationary
Subgame Perfect Equilibria implementWalrasian allocations in economies
19This is quite in contrast with standard models of directed search (see for ex-
ample Burdett, Shi and Wright, 2001), in which coordination frictions arise due to
an exogenous capacity constraint that induces agents not to coordinate on the same
location to minimize the probability of being rationed.
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with an arbitrary number of agents and commodities. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the rst work that provides strategic bargaining foun-
dations in such environments.
A remarkable aspect of the result is that it doesnt require a large
economy, or an approximation of that such as a replica economy: the
result holds for any number of agents. The limit only concerns the play-
ersdiscount factors, not the number of agents. This suggests that the
details of the bargaining process may play a crucial role in determining
the competitive outcome, independently on the number of agents in the
economy.
The role that di¤erent bargaining procedures may play in providing
strategic bargaining foundations of walrasian equilibrium is a thouroughly
unexplored question: the existing literature in this research agenda has
considered almost exclusively a specic bargaining procedure (namely,
a take-it or leave-it exchange proposal. See for instance Gale, 2000 and
references therein), and has focused mainly on the role played by the
number of agents in the economy. The ndings of this paper, and the
sensitivity of the competitive result to di¤erent specications of the bar-
gaining process shown by the works of Yildiz (2005) and Dàvila and
Eeckhout (2007, DE hereafter), suggest that a careful analysis of alter-
native bargaining protocols may be of great use to this research agenda,
and a promising direction for future research.
6.2 On the Robustness Result:
In this paper the robustness of the results obtained from our bargaining
procedure is also addressed: the results hold for a class of games that en-
compasses all the bargaining procedures of alternating o¤ers in which the
proposer announces prices and maximum trading constraints, in which
trade occurs upon unanimous acceptance, the continuation game in case
of rejection does not depend on the actions previously taken by the play-
ers, and responses are sequential. In appendix 2 a setup in which traders
respond simultaneousy is considered: it is shown that a renement of the
SSP (the SSP*) yields the same results as in the setup above. An SSP*
considers trembles in the playersresponses to an o¤er. This is done to
rule out implausible equilibria in which agents reject o¤ers they would
like, only because someone else is rejecting the o¤er: if in a SSP player
k is rejecting an o¤er at some history, all players j 6= k are indi¤erent
between rejecting and accepting that o¤er, because ks rejection makes
js actions at that history are all outcome-equivalent. For this reason,
if players respond simultaneously, we may have for instance an equilib-
rium in which everybody rejects every o¤er: in that unilateral deviations
wouldnt upset the outcome anyway. The consideration of "trembles" in
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the playersresponses rules out this sort of equilibria based on players
coordinations on a rejection. For the sake of clarity, in the appendix
it is considered only a specic case, in which the auctioneer process is
deterministic. Along the lines of the main setup, the argument can be
easily generalized to other processes in which agents respond simultane-
ously. The main message is that, in general, one can choose to model the
bargaining game with responders moving simultaneously or sequentially.
Whether the SSP* or the SSP has to be used as a solution concept con-
sequently follows. The argument is reminiscent of that relying behind
the renements of the equilibria in the normal form of a dynamic game
(see Selten 1975, or Van Damme, 1983).
6.3 On the Stationarity restriction:
It is important to emphasize that in general the restriction to Station-
ary equilibria is a strong one. Other than the simplicity of the analysis,
the general argument in favor of stationary strategies is that they entail
relatively simpler behavior, and would therefore be chosen by somewhat
boundedly rational agents. But this argument does not seem to be con-
vincing in general games.20 Recently, Sabourian (2004) and Gale and
Sabourian (2005) have made precise the sense in which boundedly ratio-
nal agents would play stationary strategies in the equilibria of their mod-
els, which allows them to overcome the di¢ culties arisen in Rubinstein
and Wolinsky (1990) without assuming away the use of non-stationary
strategies. The present paper didnt focus on these issues of complex-
ity, and the stationarity of strategies is simply assumed. Chatterjee and
Sabourian (2000) obtain stationarity of the behavior in multi-person bar-
gaining games through the introduction of complexity costs. I conjecture
that similar notions of bounded rationality can be used in the setup of
this paper to justify the restriction to stationary strategies.
20Indeed, the very notion of state space can be problematic in general. Mailath
and Samuelson (2006, ch.5) make this point very clear.
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Appendix: Proofs.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
Lets consider the utility possibility set of the economy, dened as
U := fv 2 Rn : 9x 2 X s.t. u (x) = vg
An outcome ( ; ) is stationary if there exists a measurable subset
S  S and a measurable function  : S ! U such that: (i) t =2 S
for all t = 0; 1; :::;    1; (ii)  2 S; (iii)  =  ( ). Using the
latter condition, for any stationary outcome, we may dene, for all s,
v (s) = E [ ( ) j0 = s].
Let Vn denote the set of bounded and measurable functions v : S !
Rn.
Lemma 1.1 If (; S) is a stationary outcome, then v is the unique
function in V n such that:
v (s)= (s) for all s 2 S, and
v (s)=E [v (1) j0 = s] for all s 2 SnS:
Proof: Given (; S), dene V : Vn ! Vn s.t. 8v 2 Vn,
V (v) (s) =

 (s) if s 2 S
E [v (1) j0 = s] otherwise
The lemma is established if v is the unique solution in Vn to V (v) = v.
Step 1: V () is a contraction.
Let kk denote the supnorm on Rn, and kk1 the supnorm on Vn. Let
v; v0 2 Vn. Then, if s 2 S, kV (v) (s)  V (v0) (s)k = 0; if s 2 SnS,
kV (v) (s)  V (v0) (s)k= kE [ [v (1)  v0 (1)] j0 = s]k
  kE [v (1)  v0 (1)] j0 = sk
  kv   v0k1
where  := max fi : i 2 Ig. Hence, 9 2 (0; 1) : kV (v)  V (v0)k1 
 kv   v0k1. Since Vn is a complete metric space, Banachs theorem
implies that V () has a unique xed point. We now show that v dened
above is indeed a xed point of V ().
Step 2: V (v) = v.
Dene the stopping time for agreement starting at period t = 1 as
 1, such that: 1 2 S and t =2 S for t = 1; :::;  1  1. Then, for any
s 2 S,
v (s)=E [v ( ) j0 = s]
=E

1 1v (1) j1 = s

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If s 2 S, V (v) (s) = v (s) simply by denition. If 0 = s 2
SnS, then  =  1, so:
V (v) (s)=E [v (1) j0 = s]
=E

E

1 1v (1) j1
 j0 = s
=E

E

 1v ( ) j1
 j0 = s
=E [v ( ) j0 = s]
= v (s)
QED.
From section 4, we know that a necessary condition for an allocation
x to be an SPE outcome is that, for each i, Dui (xi) [xi   ei]  0. Hence,
for the analysis of the SSP, we can restrict attention to the utility space
U := fv 2 Rn : 9x 2 X s.t. u (x) = v and Du (x) [x  e]  0g
Any SSP determines a stationary outcome ( ; ) such that  takes values
in U. Under the mantained assumptions (A1) and (A2), the set U is
compact and convex, and 0 2 U. Hence, for any ( ; ) such that the
image of  lies in U, we have that E [j0 = s] 2 U for all s.
Let W be the set of measurable functions w : S ! U. For each
agent i, dene the function 'i : Rn ! R such that, for all d 2 Rn,
'i (d) :=

0 if @v 2 U : v i  d i
max fvi : v 2 U, and v i  d ig otherwise
Under the mantained assumptions for each i the fuction 'i is well dened
and continuous.
Dene the operator E :W !W such that for w 2 W,
Ei (w) (s) =

max f'i (E [w (1) j0 = s]) ;E [iwi (1) j0 = s]g if i = a (s)
E [iwi (1) j0 = s] otherwise
Clearly, E is a continuous map.
Lemma 1.2: v is an SSP payo¤ if and only if E (v) = v.
Proof: ()) Let v be an SSP payo¤. Fix an s 2 S and let
i = a (s) If agreement does not occur at s, then it must be v (s) =
E [v (1) j0 = s]. Now, consider an alternative proposal v 2 U at
some s. If vj < E [v (1) j0 = s] for some j, the proposal is rejected;
if vj  E

jv

j (1) j0 = s

for all j, in a SSP proposal v would be ac-
cepted. Hence, a payo¤ maximizing proposer would get 'i (E [v (1) j0 = s])
from any proposal that is accepted. Since he can induce a rejection, for
agreement to occur it must be the case that 'i (E [v (1) j0 = s]) 
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E [ivi (1) j0 = s]. In other words, if v is an SSP payo¤, it is such
that
v (s) =
8>><>>:
E [v (1) j0 = s] if s 2 SnS
max
n
'a(s) (E [v (1) j0 = s]) ;E
h
a(s)v

a(s) (1) j0 = s
io
;
E
h
 a(s)v a(s) (1) j0 = s
i
if s 2 S
which clearly satises E (v) = v.
(() its obvious: from the one-shot deviation principle and the sta-
tionarity of the playersstrategy, any deviation that induces a rejection
when an acceptance is due would simply yield the continuation payo¤.
From the denition of E, in a xed point the continuation is never
strictly greater than the value at any given s. Hence, a xed point of E
would be sustained as a SSP of the game. QED.
Remark: By construction, if v is a xed point of E, then v 2
bd (U)
Proposition 1: In any SSP, agreement occurs with no delay
Proof: From the strict convexity of U, if  << 1, for any outcome
( ; ), we have that E [j0 = s] 2 U for all s. Now, let v be an
SSP payo¤, and suppose that there exists a state s in which agreement
is not reached. Then, v (s) = E [j0 = s] 2 int (U). But this is
inconsistent with v being a xed point of E. QED.
Lemma 1.3: hW ; kk1i is a compact, convex, complete metric
space.
Proof: Convexity: let w;w0 2 W, w 6= w0. For  2 (0; 1), let
w (s) = w (s) + (1  )w0 (s) for all s. Since U is convex, clearly
w : S ! U. Its clearly measurable, hence w 2 W :
Compactness: for any sequence fwg2N  W, for each s 2 S,
fw (s)g2N is a sequence in U, hence with a limit w (s) 2 U. Hence,
fwg2N ! w pointwise. Hence in the supnorm.
Completeness: Since its a compact subest of a complete metric space,
its also complete. QED.
Proposition 2: there exists an SSP.
Proof: Since E is a continuous self-map and hW ; kk1i is a non-
empty, compact, convex, subset of a linear metric space, the existence of
a xed point follows from Schauder conjecture, proved by Cauty (2001).
(see also Ok (2007), p.626).QED.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Under the mantained assumptions R, if i = 1 for every
i 2 I, the outcome (xl )l2I of an SSP with immediate acceptance is a
Walrasian Allocation.
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The proof of the theorem is completed by the next three lemmata.
Lemma 2.1: Under property 1, if  = 1, in a SSP with immediate
acceptance, (xsl )l2I = (x

l )l2I for all s 2 S:
Proof: Suppose not, i.e. for s 6= s0, (xsl )l2I 6=
 
xs
0
l

l2I .
Notice that for each s, the constraints uj (xj)  max

uj
 
xs
0
j

: s0 2 S	must
be binding for every j in equilibrium, which clerly implies that in equi-
librium, for each j, uj
 
xsj

= uj
 
xs
0
j

for all s,s0 2 S:
From strict concavity of preferences, if uj
 
xsj

= uj
 
xs
0
j

and xsj 6=
xs
0
j , it must be the case that (x
s
l )l2I is ine¢ cient, hence pairwise ine¢ -
cient (under A1): 9k; j for whom there is a transfer z from j to k that
would make both of them better o¤:
uk (x
s
k   z)>uk (xsk)
uj
 
xsj + z

>uj
 
xsj

Since xs is a SSP, it must be U-constrained e¢ cient. Hence, it must
be that Duk (xsk   z) [xsk   z   ek] < 0 and Duj
 
xsj + z
 
xsj + z   ej
 
0 for some such z. Then, if k = a (s), (i.e. he is making the o¤er xs),
provided that he would have a protable deviation from the equilibrium
inducing

(xsi )i6=k;j ;
 
xsj + z

, since these are all consistent with U.
This o¤er would be accepted, and k would be better o¤.
If k 6= a (s) (i.e. k is one of the responders), he would have a
protable deviation by rejecting all the o¤ers until he becomes the pro-
poser, and then acting as above. Hence, if we are in an equilibrium,
(xsl )l2I cannot be ine¢ cient. And if its not ine¢ cient, it must be that
(xsl )l2I = (x

l )l2I for all s 2 S. QED.
Lemma 2.2: at (xl )l2I , Dui (x

i ) [x

i   ei] = 0 for each i.
Proof: Given lemma 2.1, in a SSP with immediate acceptance it
must be the case that, for each i, and j 6= k 6= i 6= j, (xk)k 6=i solves:
(xk)k 6=i 2 arg max
(xk)k 6=i
ui
 
R 
X
k 6=i
xk
!
s.t:

Duk (xk) [xk   ek]  0
uk (xk)  uk (xi )

k 6=i
Now, suppose that J =

j 2 I : Duj
 
xj
 
xj   ej

> 0
	 6= ;, then
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(xk)k 6=i would also solve
(xk)k 6=i 2 arg max
(xk)k 6=i
ui
 
R 
X
k 6=i
xk
!
s.t. uj (xj)  uj
 
xj

for all j 2 J
Duk (xk) [xk   ek]  0
uk (xk)  uk (xi )

k=2J[fig
Notice that
[xi   ei] =
"X
k 6=i
ek  
X
k 6=i
xk
#
andX
j2J

xj   ej

=
"X
k=2J
ek   xk
#
Fix j 2 J . From e¢ ciency, under the mantained assumptions of the
smooth general equilibrium model, we know that 8l 6= j, 9jl > 0 :
Duj
 
xj

= jlDul (x

l ). Let ji = min

jl : l 6= j
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Adding up the constraints for js optimization problem
0
X
k 6=j
Duk (x

k) [x

k   ek]
=Duj
 
xj
 "X
k 6=j
1
jk
[xk   ek]
#
=Duj
 
xj
 " 1
ji
[xi   ei] +
X
k 6=i;j
1
jk
[xk   ek]
#
=Duj
 
xj
 " 1
ji
"X
k 6=i
ek  
X
k 6=i
xk
#
+
X
k 6=i;j
1
jk
[xk   ek]
#
=Duj
 
xj
 " 1
ji

ej   xj

+
X
k 6=i;j

1
jk
  1
ji

[xk   ek]
#
=Duj
 
xj
24 1
ji

ej   xj

+
X
k2Jnfj;ig

1
ji
  1
jk

[ek   xk] +
X
k=2J[fig

1
jk
  1
ji

[xk   ek]
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=
1
ji
Duj
 
xj
 
ej   xj

+
X
k2Jnfj;ig

jk
ji
  1

Duk (x

k) [ek   xk]
+
X
k=2J[fig

1  jk
ji

Duk (x

k) [x

k   ek]
< 0
which yields the desired contradiction. (The absurd hypothesis implies
that the rst term and the rst summation are negative, while the terms
in the last summation are negative by construction, for
jk
ji
> 1 and
Duk (x

k) [x

k   ek] for k =2 J . The contradiction follows immediately).
QED.
Lemma 2.3: (xl )l2I is a Walrasian allocation.
Proof:From the previous lemma, it su¢ cies to set p = Du1 (x1), to
have that, 8i,
xi 2 argmax
xi
ui (xi)
pxi= pei
Lemma 3 concludes the proof of theorem 1.QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Proposition 3:  () is an u.h.c. correspondance
25
Proof: Since (from Berges Maximum Theorem)  is u.h.c. in ,
also  () is u.h.c. (this follows from lemma A3 in DE).
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